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RULES OF EVIDENCE-SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL?
EDMUND M. MORGAN*
It hardly needs stating that the definition of a legal word or term
depends upon the purpose for which it is to be defined. If in framing
a generalization designed to state a rule or make a discrimination
applicable in a specific topic or field of the law, the courts use speci-
fied terms, it by no means follows that they intend those terms to be
understood in the same sense in generalizations dealing with problems
in another topic or field. The words, substance or substantive and
procedure or pocedural, have been used most frequently in three
separate situations: (1) in dealing with controversies concerning
the applicability in one territorial jurisdiction of the law of another
territorial jurisdiction, (2) in determining the applicability in a
federal court of the law of the state in which the federal court is
sitting in a trial between citizens of different states, and (3) in deter-
mining the operative effect of a statute enacted after the happening
of the event or creation of the condition which is the subject of the
action. In all of them the solution is generally expressed in terms of
procedure or substance. In none of them does the meaning given the
term therein furnish a compelling answer to our question.
Consequently, whether a constitutional or statutory provision rec-
ognizes or confers or creates the power of a court to regulate pro-
cedure, its interpretation requires an elementary analysis of our
system of litigation.
The court does not initiate litigation. It has no instrumentalities of
its own for discovering the existence or tenor of a dispute between
potential litigants, or for discovering and assembling the factual
materials necessary or suitable for the resolution of such a dispute.
It knows or is charged with knowledge of the content and applicability
of every proposition of law pertinent to every dispute properly pre-
sented to it; but as to the truth of any of the potentially pertinent
disputable propositions of fact, it knows nothing. It is the function
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of Law Emeritus and former Acting Dean, Harvard Law School; Reporter
A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence; member, Supreme Court Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; co-editor, Morgan & Maguire, Cases and
Materials on Evidence (3d ed. 1951); author, Basic Problems of Evidence
(1954).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
of the parties to define the area of dispute and to present the materials
for its resolution. The burdens or duties which the performance of
this function entails, the court distributes between the parties. As
to the area of dispute, it assigns to each party the burden of asserting
the existence of a specified state of fact which would create or destroy
pertinent legal relations between him and his opponent. As to resolu-
tion of the dispute, it allocates to one party or the other the burden
of presenting materials of sufficient persuasive force to convince the
trier of the truth of each proposition of fact upon which he is relying.
These are the familiar burden of pleading and burden of proof. If
a party fails to assert the existence of a specified state of fact as to
which he has this burden of pleading, the court assumes that it does
not exist. If a party fails to present the materials which convince the
trier of the truth of a proposition which he has the burden of proving,
the court assumes its falsity.
In such a system it seems too clear for debate that the rules which
determine the legal relations between the parties when all the facts
are known or assumed are rules of substance. All other rules have
to do with the methods by which the machinery for the administration
of justice is set in motion, the methods by which the limits of the con-
troversy are defined and the materials for decision are to be presented
and handled. They can hardly be said to do more than regulate the
method of proceeding to secure a determination of substantive rights
and duties. They are guides to judges and litigants for the use of
the judicial machinery for finding facts and not mandates to the
judges as to the legal effect of the findings which the proper operation
of the machine will produce.
The rules of evidence are among these guides. Rules 43 and 44 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rules 26, 27 and 28 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure are framed upon this theory. Their
adoption by the Supreme Court justifies the inference that at least a
majority of all its members approved this theory. In explaining the
scope of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Institute held by the
American Bar Association in Cleveland, Ohio, in July 1938, former
Attorney-General William D. Mitchell, whose opinion in this field is
entitled to great weight, said:
Next, there is the question of evidence. When the Committee first met,
our first reaction was that dealing with the rules of evidence was not
within the scope of the statute, and that the words 'pleading, practice and
procedure' were not intended by Congress to provide for a revision of
the evidence rules. That was our offhand impression. We changed that
after we had given the matter further consideration, and were fortified
by ample authority to the effect that rules of evidence are matters of
procedure....
There was a tremendous pressure brought on the Advisory Committee by
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those familiar with the subject of evidence insisting that there was a need
for reform, which we did not meet, and some day some other advisory
committee should tackle the task of revising the rules of evidence and
composing them into a new set of rules to be promulgated by the Supreme
Court.1
Does this conclusion fail to give due weight to judicially recognized
classifications? The case in which it is most frequently declared that
the decision turns upon the distinction between rules of substance
and rules of procedure involves the choice between conflicting rules
of law. Where an action between P and D is pending before a court of
state A and all the operative facts occurred in state B or the situation
is treated under the applicable rule of conflicts as if all the facts had
occurred in state B, there is no question that the court of A will gen-
erally act as if it were a court of B in determining (1) whether those
facts created an interest in P subject to legal protection against in-
fringement by D, and (2) whether they constitute an infringement of
such an interest by D that a court of B would furnish P a remedy
against D. This is a cumbersome way of saying that the court of A
will apply the law of B to determine whether P has a cause of action
against D; that is, whether upon all the facts, as disclosed or assumed,
D owes P a duty to make legal amends to P. That is a question of
substantive law. It has n6thing to do with the method by which such
an action would be initiated in state B or the means by which the
truth of the controverted propositions of fact would be made to appear
to the courts of state B.
It goes without saying that P cannot ask state A to set up special
machinery for the purpose of handling litigation imported from state
B or a special method or means of stimulating A's tribunals to act.
He must use the machinery and method which A has provided and
which it uses in litigation originating in A. The materials which the
parties can be permitted to feed into A's machine must be such as it
can satisfactorily process. Experience with that machinery has con-
vinced the courts of A that it can operate efficiently and turn out
a satisfactory product by using specified kinds of raw materials and
no others. For example, they may have found that A's triers of fact
either can or cannot be trusted to give proper weight to the testimony
of witnesses who lack designated qualities or attributes, or to subject
to proper discount lay opinion or certain classes of hearsay, or to
evaluate oral evidence as to some kinds of transactions. Whether
the courts of B have reached the same or different conclusions con-
cerning the capabilities of B's triers of fact is entirely immaterial. All
these matters which have to do with the efficient operation of the
1. AmERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF CIrJ[L PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON THE FED-
ERAL RULES 186 (Cleveland, Ohio 1938).
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judicial machine to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed
are matters of procedure and are governed by the rules of state A.
All of the foregoing is strictly in accord with chapter 12 of the Re-
statement of Conflict of Laws, and the usually accepted generalization
that the law of the locus contractus or delicti governs substance and
the law of the forum governs procedure.
On the other hand, there is an underlying widely accepted considera-
tion of policy which induces the court that deems it proper to accept
the imported litigation to try to reach as far as practicable the same
result as the courts of the state which created the cause of action would
have reached. A litigant should not be able to secure for himself a
greater benefit or force upon his opponent a heavier detriment by
shopping for the most favorable available forum. Consequently, the
court of A may find it wise and practicable to modify a rule of its
procedure by applying a procedural rule which the courts of B would
have applied in a situation where the application of B's rule would
be likely to produce a different result. This consideration has recently
received constantly increasing emphasis. And in order that the long
accepted generalization shall appear to "moult no feather," the courts
of the forum are tending to declare to be rules of substance those rules
of procedure of the locus which they think it expedient to apply. This
tendency has been given great impetus by the United States Supreme
Court in applying the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.2 That case had
nothing to do with any distinction between procedure and substance.
It concerned only the applicability of the law of the state in a con-
troversy between citizens of different states in a trial in a federal
court. But the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, because of its prog-
eny, legitimate and illegitimate, requires analysis and classification
to prevent misapplication of the decision and uncritical acceptance
of the dictum in situations to which neither has any pertinence.
Article 3, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States provides:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, aris-
ing under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority . .. to contro-
versies.., between citizens of different states... ." Section 4 of the
Judiciary Act of 17893 established circuit courts, and section 11 con-
ferred upon them original cognizance of "all suits of a civil nature at
common law or in equity where the matter in dispute exceeds, ex-
clusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars and ... the
suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State." In 1875 the language was changed to conform
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It may seem a waste of good white paper to add to
the plethora of comment upon the Erie case, but an attempt to demonstrate
its inapplicability to the situations which do not involve any problem of
conflict of laws may possibly be pardoned.
3. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1949), § 41 (Supp. 1956).
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with that of the Constitution and to include for the first time con-
troversies "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States
or treaties made or [which] shall be made under their authority."4
It seems clear then that for nearly a century Congress deemed of
prime importance the right of a citizen of another state to have his
controversy with a citizen of the forum state tried by a tribunal of
the national government regardless of the subject of the action. There
can be little or no doubt that during those years the controversies
included federal questions as well as those of municipal law, or that
the Court was considered, and was in fact, as much a national court
when trying a non-federal issue as when trying one involving no such
issue. Consequently the 34th section of the Act of 1789 was applicable
in all litigation regardless of its subject matter.
That section provides "The Laws of the several States, except where
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall other-
wise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the Courts of the United States in cases where they
apply."
Mr. Charles Warren5 has made it clear that this section was not
included in the original draft bill but was inserted as a Senate amend-
ment. The original text of the amendment read: "And be it further
enacted that the Statute law of the several States in force for the time
being and their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by
adoption from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of
the same or otherwsie except," etc. as in the enacted section. The
words "Statute law" were crossed out and the word "Laws" sub-
stituted, and all the words between "several States" and "except"
were deleted. Had this information been presented to the Court in
1842, it is probable, as Mr. Warren asserts, that the word "Laws"
would not have been judicially construed as the equivalent of "stat-
utes." It is likely that it would have been held to include the common
law; but it does not follow that the decision in Swift v. Tyson6 would
have been different. First, Mr. Warren does not contend that Congress
had no power to deal with substantive rights and duties in situations
involving citizens of different states. Second, the section contains no
mandate to the United States courts as to the effect of decisions of a
state tribunal purporting to determine the content of the common law.
It cannot be seriously doubted that Mr. Justice Story was stating the
theory, then and for a long time prior and subsequent thereto, ac-
cepted by common law judges and lawyers,7 when he declared:
4. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (1949).
5. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HAnv. L. REv. 49, 85-88 (1923).
6. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
7. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's statements in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1945).
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In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended, that the
decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of
what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws. They are often re-
examined, reversed and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever
they are found to be either defective, or ill founded, or otherwise incor-
rect.
8
This is in no sense contrary to the argument of counsel, to which
Mr. Warren refers,9 in Sims v. Irvine: "The 34th section of the judicial
act [1 Stat. 92] adopts the laws of the several states, as rules of deci-
sion in trials at common law: Now, as in England the laws are defined
to be general customs, local customs, and acts of Parliament (1 Bl.
C. 63); so in Pennsylvania, the laws must be defined to be the common
law, as modified by practice, and acts of the General Assembly."'10
Under this theory, the question was the effect of the decisions of
the state court as to the tenor of the common law upon the function
of the federal circuit court to determine that tenor. There was in 1842
no contention that the circuit court had less authority than any other
common law trial court to determine in the first instance the tenor of
any non-statutory rule applicable to the controversy before it, that
is to say, of the applicable common law rule, or that its ruling was
open to either review or control by any court save the United States
Supreme Court. The concept stated by Mr. Justice Bradley in 1883
seems to have been subject to no judicial doubt up to that time:
The Federal courts have an independent jurisdiction in the adminis-
tration of State laws, co-ordinate with, and not subordniate to, that of
the State courts, and are bound to exercise their own judgment as to
the meaning and effect of those laws. The existence of two co-ordinate
jurisdictions in the same territory is peculiar, and the results would be
anomalous and inconvenient but for the exercise of mutual respect and
deference .... Acting on these principles, founded as they are on comity
and good sense, the courts of the United States, without sacrificing their
own dignity as independent tribunals, endeavor to avoid and in most
cases do avoid, any unseemly conflict with the well considered decisions
of the State courts. As, however, the very object of giving to the national
courts jurisdiction to administer the laws of the States in controversies
between citizens of different States was to institute independent tribunals
which it might be supposed would be unaffected by local prejudices and
sectional views, it would be a dereliction of their duty not to exercise an
independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication.11
It was not until ten years later that Story's interpretation was
judicially attacked as violating the United States Constitution. Mr.
Justice Field, after insisting that Story's interpretation of the word
8. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9. Warren, supra note 5, at 88 n.85.
10. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 425, 454-55 (1799).
11. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1883).
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"laws" was too narrow and if applied to the same word in the four-
teenth amendment would result in unequal protection of the law,
contended that it made the statute an infringement of the tenth amend-
ment. He declared that "There is no unwritten general or common
law of the United States ... 2 which controls a conflicting law of a
state. To hold otherwise would be to violate the Constitution,
"... which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence
of the States-independence in their legislative and independence in
their judicial departments."'
3
Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the majority of the Court in the
Baugh case, repeated Mr. Justice Bradley's statement in the Seligman
case, and pointed out that Congress had not amended the act in the
fifty years in which this interpretation had been applied. In Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co.,14 Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, first pointed out
that the issue in that case was title to real estate and under the doc-
trine of Swift v. Tyson was to be resolved by the law of the state as
declared by the state courts, and asserted that in Gelpcke v. City of
Dubuque15 the Court had recognized that a line of harmonious deci-
sions applying a judicially made rule constituted the law of the state
and would be given a prospective operation. He continued:
It is said that we must exercise our independent judgment-but as to
what? Surely as to the law- of the States. Whence does that law issue?
Certainly not from us. But it does issue and has been recognized by this
court as issuing from the state courts as well as from the state legislatures.
When we know what the source of the law has said that it shall be, our
authority is at an end. The law of a State does not become something
outside of the state court and independent of it by being called the com-
mon law. Whatever it is called, it is the law as declared by the state
judges and nothing else.16
It may not be irreverent or entirely irrelevant to suggest that these
pronouncements assume not merely the undesirability but the legal
impossibility of the existence in a single territory of a system having
two courts of coordinate jurisdiction with no common superior-a
system the existence of which the Supreme Court had then explicitly
recognized for nearly seventy years.
Mr. Justice Holmes stated his theory more fully in his dissent in
the Black & White Taxicab Co. 17 case:
But the question is important and in my opinion the prevailing doc-
12. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 394 (1893) (dissenting).
13. Id. at 401.
14. 215 U.S. 349, 370 (1910).
15. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864).
16. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910).
17. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab &
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 532-35 (1928).
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trine has Leen accepted upon a subtle fallacy that never has been analyzed.
If I am right the fallacy has resulted in an unconstitutional assumption of
powers by the Courts 'f the United States which no lapse of time or
respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct. There-
fore I think it proper to state what I think the fallacy is. The often re-
peated proposition of this and the lower Courts is that the parties are
entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law. By that
phrase is meant matters that are not governed by any law of the United
States or by any statute of the State-matters that in States other than
Louisiana are governed in most respects by what is called the common
law. It is through this phrase that what I think the fallacy comes in.
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit,
cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, from the
State Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately,
and criticise them as right or wrong according to the writer's notions of
a single theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one
august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court
concerned. If there were such a transcendental body of law outside of
any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until changed by
statute, the Courts of the United States might be right in using their
independent judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of
law. The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that
there is this outside thing to be found. Law is a word used with different
meanings, but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does
not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law
so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not,
is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by
the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in
England or anywhere else. It may be adopted by statute in place of
another system previously in force. Boquillas Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S.
339, 345. But a general adoption of it does not prevent the State Courts
from refusing to follow the English decisions upon a matter where the
local conditions are different....
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of general
law the decisions of the highest Court should establish the law until
modified by statute or by a later decision of the same Court, I do not
perceive how it would be possible for a Court of the United States to
refuse to follow what the State Court decided in that domain. But when
the Constitution of a State establishes a Supreme Court it by implication
does make that declaration as clearly as if it had said it in express words,
so far as it is not interfered with by the superior power of the United
States. The Supreme Court of a State does something more than make a
scientific inquiry into a fact outside of and independent of it. It says,
with an authority that no one denies, except when a citizen of another
State is able to invoke an exceptional jurisdiction, that thus the law is
and shall be. Whether it be said to make or to declare the law, it deals
with the law of the State with equal authority however its function may
be described.
In the Erie case Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the majority,
accepted the view of Mr. Justice Holmes and declared section 34 of
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the Act of 1789 constitutional but its previous interpretation uncon-
stitutional.
To what extent is the Holmes theory invulnerable to attack? To
what extent do judges "make the law," and is it true that their decla-
rations as to what the law shall be are as effective as an enactment of
the legislative department? When confronted with a controversy
properly brought before it, the court is bound to resolve the dispute by
a decision for one or the other of the litigants. It cannot refuse to do
so simply because there is no applicable legislative enactment. When
it has made its determination, the rule which was necessary for the
decision of the right-duty relationship of the parties was the rule of
law for those parties in that controversy. Assume that this rule was
expressly stated by the court. It operated retroactively. If the court
was a court of last resort, it might have decided either way, regardless
of the manner in which it had previously decided. And the result is
no different if we assume that the common law has a transcendental
existence-a brooding omnipresence-which is to be discovered by
the court of the territory over which it is hovering. When that court
on its exploratory expedition discovers what it believes to be the law
or that part of the law applicable to the controversy, that which is
discovered will constitute the law between these parties for the solu-
tion of their dispute, and they may, if they wish, take comfort in
the fact that such was always the law, rather than grieve over the
assumption of powers by the court which no legislature could properly
have exercised. Of course the truth is that under our common law
adversary system, the courts have always made law retrospectively.
Judicially-created law must be retrospective, for it is always applied
to situations that occurred in the past.
To what extent is it prospective in the sense that legislative enact-
ments affecting substantive rights and duties almost always must be?
That answer is found in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin-
ing Co.18 The Supreme Court of Montana had interpreted a Montana
statute as giving the Board of Railroad Commissioners power to
change prescribed rates if found to be unreasonable and as entitling a
shipper, after complying with stated conditions, to recover amounts
paid under the original rate in excess of those fixed in the changed
rate. In the case at bar the shipper-plaintiff had so complied and
recovered judgment for .excess charges made under a changed rate.
On appeal the Court stated that its prior rulings had been erroneous,
that the statute properly interpreted did not operate to make the
changed rate retroactive, that the mistaken interpretation to the
contrary governed the present controversy, but that it would not be
18. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
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applied to future transactions. In affirming the judgment Mr. Justice
Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
This is not a case where a court in overruling an earlier decision has
given to the new ruling a retroactive bearing, and thereby made invalid
what was valid in the doing. Even that may often be done, though liti-
gants not infrequently have argued to the contrary. [Citing cases]. This
is a case where a court has refused to make its ruling retroactive, and
the novel stand is taken that the Constitution of the United States is
infringed by the refusal.
We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A
state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later
overruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed
there are decisions intimating too broadly . . . that it must give them
that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them
if it pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted.
[Citing Gelpcke v. Dubuque, and numerous other cases]. On the other
hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its
courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration,
in which the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never
been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning. [Citing
cases]. The alternative is the same whether the subject of the new
decision is common law or statute. [Citing cases]. The choice for any
state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her
courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not
the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their acts .... The
common law [of Montana] as administered by her judges ascribes to the
decisions of her highest court the power to bind and loose that is unex-
tinguished, for intermediate transactions, by a decision overruling them.
As applied to such transactions we may say of the earlier decision that
it has not been overruled at all. It has been translated into a judgment
of affirmance and recognized as law anew. Accompanying the recognition
is a prophecy, which may or may not be realized in conduct, that transac-
tions arising in the future will be governed by a different rule. If this
is the common law doctrine of adherence to precedent as understood and
enforced by the Courts of Montana, we are not at liberty, for anything
contained in the Constitution of the United States, to thrust upon those
courts a different conception either of the binding force of precedent or
of the meaning of the judicial process.19
It would be difficult to find a clearer statement of the effect of
judicial law making concerning past transactions and of the essence
of the doctrine of stare decisis. Both are in strict accord with the
theory of Mr. Justice Holmes, as stated by him. As to past transac-
tions: "Judicial decisions have had retrospective operation for near
a thousand years."2 0 As to future controversies: "Law is a statement
of the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear
19. Id. at 364-66.
20. Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (dissenting).
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upon men through the courts. But the word commonly is confined
to such prophecies or threats when addressed to persons living within
the power of the courts."21 It is too obvious for debate that a court
is at liberty to refuse to follow precedent whenever it deems it wise
to do so. The rules laid down in the decisions of the highest court
can be no more than the basis for a prediction that they will be treated
as a statute must be treated. Hence it cannot be said that what the
court has treated and applied as the common law today will neces-
sarily be applied as common law to controversies before it tomorrow.
If the court is to be regarded as the source of the law, it can be so only
in the sense that it has in any decided case stated as law the rule
which it has therein applied and has also said that, as then advised, it
intends to apply the same rule in the future. It is doubtless the source
and creator of the law therein applied retrospectively, but as to law
to be applied in the future, it has furnished only the basis for a pre-
diction.
In June 1940 in the Gobitis case,2 the United States Supreme Court
held it to be no violation of the constitutional guaranty of religious
freedom to require a salute to the flag as a condition of the right to
attend a state public school. In October, 1942, a United States District
Court held the contrary and in June, 1943, the Supreme Court affirmed
this decision of the district court.3 If the Gobitis decision was the
law until 1943, how could it have failed to be law in October 1942?
Speaking loosely, it may be permissible to say that the court has made
the law for transactions subsequent to the date of its decision; speak-
ing accurately, it may properly be said that, in the absence of a con-
trary controlling statute, it will in the future make the law in future
controversies; but it cannot be accurately said that it has legislated
or can legislate for the future or has performed a legislative function
in making its decisions.
There is no room for doubt that for the purpose of application in
any controversy properly brought before it, the United States Supreme
Court is the final authority as to the interpretation of every provision
of the Constitution and of Acts of Congress. From 1842 until 1938 it
interpreted the constitutional grant of jurisdiction and section 34 of
the Judiciary Act as giving the United States court co-ordinate juris-
diction with the state court and authority in diversity cases to deter-
mine the content of the common law of the forum state. It cannot be
said that during this period the Constitution and the Act of Congress
conferred no such jurisdiction or authority without saying that a deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court construing a constitutional
provision can be and was itself unconstitutional. And this is certainly
21. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909).
22. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
23. West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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no time for the Court to regard such a proposition as even debatable.
To do so would be to accept the very theory which the Erie decision
repudiated. It would be conceding that the real meaning of those
constitutional and statutory provisions is a brooding omnipresence
which is and always has been hovering over all the territory of the
United States but which escaped discovery by the judges for nearly
a century.
Whatever the theory of Erie may be, it was not applied or said to be
applicable to anything except rules governing substantive legal rela-
tions. And in this connection it is pertinent to remember that prior to
Erie the Court in its interpretation of- section 34 had never made a dis-
tinction between procedure and substance as such. In Steamboat Co.
v. Chase,24 the Court explained that in certain cases a litigant had
an option to proceed in admiralty or in a common law court and stated
the following as a familiar principle:
State legislatures may regulate the practice, proceedings, and rules of
evidence in their own courts, and those rules, under the 34th section of
the Judiciary Act, become, in suits at common law, the rules of decision,
where they apply, in the Circuit Courts. 25
In Potter v. National Bank26 the Court refused to apply the state law
as to the incompetency of an interested survivor only because the
existing statutes of the United States did "otherwise provide," so
that the excepting clause of the 34th section was applicable. Four
years later the Court held applicable a statute of the forum state mak-
ing communications between patient and physician privileged.27 It
pointed out that the 34th section had been uniformly construed as
including state rules of evidence, and that there was no applicable
statute of the United States covering the subject. The passage of the
Conformity Act of 1872, which provided that the practice, pleadings,
and forms and modes of proceeding in causes, other than equity and
admiralty causes, should conform as near as may be to those in the
state courts, made no change in this respect, except perhaps to enlarge
the discretionary powers of the United States courts.
The Erie opinion was rendered in April 1938. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had then been approved by the Supreme Court and
had been transmitted to Congress. They became effective in Septem-
ber 1938, and "thereafter," as the enabling act provided, "all laws in
conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect." During the
next six years the Erie decision was cited by the Court in numerous
decisions involving unquestioned substantive rights. In no case was
24. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 522 (1873).
25. Id. at 534.
26. 102 U.S. 163 (1880).
27. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Union Trust Co., 112 U.S. 250 (1884).
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its pertinence to state rules of procedure raised or discussed until
1945. Prior to that time in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.2 8 the minority of
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, had insisted that
rule 35 authorizing the Court to order a physical examination of a
party to the action was not within the authority conferred by the
enabling act, because the Botsford 9 case had held that in the absence
of statute a federal court had no power to make such an order:
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy
in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their
prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authori-
zation to formulate rules for the more uniform and effective dispatch of
business on the civil side of the federal courts.
.... Plainly the Rules are not acts of Congress and cannot be treated
as such.3 0
The majority repudiated both these propositions:
The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judi-
cial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infrac-
tion of them..... Evidently the Congress felt the rule was written within the ambit of
the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it from the proposed body
of rules, although this specific rule was attacked and defended before
the committees of the two Houses .... We conclude that the rules under
attack are within the authority granted.31
In 1945 the York32 case raised the question whether in an equity ac-
tion in which the jurisdiction of the federal court depended upon di-
versity of citizenship the statute of limitations of the state was
controlling. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority,
pointed out that in many decisions such a statute was deemed pro-
cedural because dealing only with the remedy, and declared:
The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner and
means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced,
or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance in the
aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly
affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of
a State that would be controlling upon the same claim by the same parties
in a State court?
.... It [the Erie decision] expressed a policy that touches vitally the
proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal Courts....
The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for
28. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
29. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
30. 312 U.S. at 18.
31. Id. at 14-16.
32. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in
a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead
to a substantially different result.33
It will be noted that this decision did not strike down any express
rule of civil procedure. But in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer and
Warehouse Co.,34 the Court, with only Mr. Justice Rutledge dissent-
ing, held that rule 3 providing that an action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court could not be applied to toll the Kansas
statute of limitations which required service of summons to begin an
action. And in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,35 the ma-
jority held a New Jersey statute requiring a bond of indemnity for
costs and expenses in a derivative action must be applied although
rule 23 expressly deals with the subject and imposes a different con-
dition. This was too much even for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who in
the York case had declared that in diversity cases a federal court ad-
judicating a state-created right "is for that purpose, in effect, only
another court of the State...."36
If these decisions mean that section 34 is still controlling with
reference to procedural rules, they totally disregard the excepting
clause. If they mean that a proper interpretation of the constitutional
provision and section 34 of the Judicial Code and the Act authorizing
the Court to make rules of procedure, taken together, make the state
law apply to any rule which is "outcome determinative," they may
possibly mean that Congress has no power to prescribe for a court
created by it a procedural regulation which has a determinative effect
upon the outcome of an action for the enforcement of a state-created
right, whatever its power may be with reference to other subject
matter-a truly startling proposition which has never been squarely
asserted, adequately argued, or expressly decided.37 To be sure, they
may mean only that in the absence of express legislative direction to
the contrary, the Court deems it good policy to interpret the enabling
act as authorizing the Court to promulgate rules having the effect
not of law but as mere procedural regulations of matters of no ap-
preciable importance upon the result of the litigation. If so, they have
destroyed the usefulness, at least in the federal courts, of the most
practicable and effective plan for procedural reform that has yet been
devised. And it may be questioned whether it was necessary for the
33. Id. at 109.
34. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
35. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
36. 326 U.S. at 108. If this is true it puts every federal judge, including the
Justices of the Supreme Court, upon the same level as a state judge of a
municipal court; and it is high time to abolish jurisdiction based only upon
diversity of citizenship.
37. See Stayton, An Easement to Decision: A Servitude upon Judicial Legis-




Court to pay so high a price to provide a remedy against the repetition
of the injustices and discriminations caused by its pre-Erie extensions
of the scope of the Swift v. Tyson decision, especially when applied
in connection with its own ill-conceived fiction of corporate citizenship.
But whatever the meaning or implication, it has no application to
the problem of determining the distribution of legislative and judicial
powers in the government of a single state or other entirely inde-
pendent territorial unit of government.
The situation in which there is no question as to the applicability
of the domestic law without reference to that of any other jurisdiction
and in which procedural rules always have an important impact upon
the result of litigation is that in which the issue is the applicability
of legislation to controversies which arise before its enactment. The
United States Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws in criminal
prosecutions and the deprivation of property without due process of
law in civil actions. In construing these provisions it is hornbook
learning that no person has a vested right in a rule of procedure, in-
cluding evidence. In Calder v. Bul, 38 Mr. Justice Chase did not
recognize this generalization and in a dictum, classified as a pro-
hibited ex post facto law "every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law re-
quired at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender." But this dictum has been repudiated in later
cases except in so far as it concerns the sufficiency of the evidence
to justify a conviction. In Hopt v. Utah,39 the court held applicable
at a trial for murder a statute enacted after the offense making com-
petent as a witness a person theretofore incompetent because a con-
victed felon. Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Harlan said:
But alterations which do not increase the punishment, nor change the
ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish
guilt, but-leaving untouched the nature of the crime and the amount
or degree of proof essential to conviction-only remove existing restric-
tions upon the competency of certain classes of persons as witnesses,
relate to modes of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a
vested right, and which the State, upon grounds of public policy, may
regulate at pleasure.40
Thompson v. Missouri4 ' presented a like problem concerning com-
petency of evidence. The Supreme Court of Missouri on appeal
from a judgment of conviction for murder by poison had ordered a
new trial on the ground that the trial judge had admitted specimens
of accused's handwritings solely as bases for comparison with the
38. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
39. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
40. Id. at 590.
41. 171 U.S. 380 (1898).
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disputed signature on a prescription for poison. Before the second
trial a statute was enacted making admissible specimens of hand-
writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine. At the
second trial the specimens were again admitted and the defendant
again convicted. Judgment of conviction, upheld on appeal by the
Supreme Court of Missouri, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. In Beazell v. Ohio,42 Mr. Justice Stone, writing
for a unanimous court, held valid the retrospective application of a
statute requiring a joint trial of defendants jointly indicted. He
cited with approval the foregoing decisions, and others which had
enforced the same rule with reference to statutes which respectively
(a) changed the place of trial, (b) abolished an existing court for
hearing criminal appeals and created a new one, (c) empowered the
state to appeal from an order granting the accused a new trial and
(d) changed the qualifications for service on grand juries and on petit
juries.
The Supreme Court of Alabama,43 acting on the same principle, held
that husband and wife were competent witnesses although the statute
which made them so had been enacted after the commission of the
offense charged. The Court of Appeals of California made a similar
ruling as to a constitutional amendment which permitted the judge
to comment upon the weight of the evidence and credibility of the
witnesses,44 and the Supreme Court of Colorado held that a rule of
court so providing was properly given retroactive operation.
45
Obviously all ex post facto laws are retroactive, but not all retro-
active laws are ex post facto, as the courts have defined this latter
phrase. And it follows that in civil cases retroactive procedural
regulations do not on that account violate the due process clause.
Thus in ReitZer v. Harris,46 the Supreme Court held that a statute had
been properly applied retrospectively in a proceeding to forfeit a
sale of school lands on account of the buyer's breach of certain pro-
visions of the contract of sale. The statute made an entry of for-
feiture in the County Clerk's records of school land sales prima facie
evidence that all the required procedure had been followed, including
notice to the buyer. Mr. Justice Van Devanter said "That such a
statute does not offend against either the contract clause or the due
process of law clause of the Constitution . .. is now well settled."
47
That the courts of the several states recognize the same doctrine is
42. 269 U.S. 167 (1925). See also Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 29 N.W. 911
(1886), holding retrospective a statute making the judge rather than the jury
the judge of the law in criminal prosecutions.
43. Wester v. State, 142 Ala. 56, 38 So. 1010 (1905).
44. People v. Talkington, 8 Cal. App. 2d 75, 47 P.2d 368 (1935).
45. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931).
46. 223 U.S. 437, (1912).
47. Id. at 442.
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illustrated by the opinion in Sackheim v. Pigueron4 8 where the
Court of Appeals of New York held retrospective a statute allocating
the burden of proving contributory negligence to the defendant, al-
though at the time of the injury the common law rule, which required
plaintiff to prove due care, had uniformly been applied. The court
deemed the principle so commonly accepted as to require citation only
to standard generalizations.
Cases in this field, it is submitted, are of high relevance where the
purpose of the discrimination is the distribution of function between
the legislature and the judiciary. It is axiomatic that there is and can
be no bright line between these two departments of government.
And it is now clearly recognized that regulation of procedure may
be assigned to either. Consequently when a constitutional or statutory
provision assigns the regulation of procedure to the judiciary, no
constitutional objection can be raised in situations where court-made
rules do not interfere with vested rights in civil cases or violate
the prohibition against ex post facto laws or some other specific
mandate such as that prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination.
It is definitely settled by judicial authority that regulations making
competent witnesses theretofore incompetent are procedural; the
same is true as to provisions making admissible relevant evidence
theretofore excludable on objection of the adverse parties. The only
limits are those upon regulations which would give to a fact when
proved a value which would make it, in and of itself, a basis for a
purely speculative or totally unreasonable deduction.
When legislatures draft codes of procedure, they frequently, if not
usually, include rules governing not only the competency but also
the privileges of witnesses, and when they include any regulations
as to evidence, as they often do, they make provision for the use of
privileged communications. This warrants the conclusion that when
a legislature purports to delegate or does delegate to the courts the
function of regulating procedure, it intends to include the subject
of privileges and privileged communications. And the same should be
true when the supreme law-making body, the people in adopting a
constitution, uses the same language. In view of the host of current
decisions upholding the delegation of legislative functions to various
administrative tribunals, it would be difficult indeed to frame a
serious argument that the judiciary is not the group with the quali-
fications most suited to determine what regulations are needed for
the process of administering justice. The so-called common law
privileges of witnesses were created by judicial decision; they have
been modified by judicial decision, and in the absence of statute,
can be disregarded or abolished by judicial decision. They are
48. 215 N.Y. 62, 109 N.E. 109 (1915).
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nothing more or less than privileges to suppress the truth, and no
officers of any department of government, other than the judiciary,
have the constant opportunity to observe them in operation and the
skill to determine how far and in what respects they interfere with
the orderly and effective administration of justice.
It is therefore submitted that in the construction of a constitutional
or statutory provision recognizing or conferring upon the courts the
function of regulating procedure, the analysis with which this essay
begins is pertinent, is in accord with the understanding of judges
and legislatures when considering the distribution of governmental
powers or functions, and is not affected by factors applicable to the
problem of conflicts of laws between several states or independent
governments or between the federal government and a state govern-
ment. It follows that such a provision should be interpreted as
vesting in the courts the power to make rules of evidence, including
those governing competency and privilege of witnesses and privileged
communications.
